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Abstract: Despite a cascade of corruption scandals over the last decade, the role of
political corruption has yet to be accounted for in the scholarship on Spanish urban
entrepreneurialism. This is an omission that extends to the broader literature on the
topic as well. This paper looks at the theoretical causes of this neglect and explores ways
of integrating corruption into the study of urban entrepreneurialism. To do so, it offers
a systematic analysis of the role of clientelism in the political economy of Spanish inter-
urban competition. Contrary to the existing literature, which at best explains away cor-
ruption as a logical outgrowth of intensified competition for real estate capital, this
paper argues that corruption is rooted in a political structure that precedes the emer-
gence of urban entrepreneurialism. This structure is identified as an “iron triangle”, a
complex of colluding interests formed by the state, the real estate industry, and political
parties.
Keywords: Spain, urban entrepreneurialism, corruption, informality, state theory, clien-
telism
Introduction
In 2018, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy was ousted from power after a
corruption sentence confirmed that his party, the conservative Partido Popular
(PP), had been running a decades-long scheme to trade politically allocated
resources for illicit campaign donations. To nobody’s surprise, the country’s pow-
erful construction companies figured prominently amongst the donors—after all,
the fall of Rajoy was only the culmination of a decade of relentless scandal around
urban development. The corruption avalanche began with the arrest of high-rank-
ing officials of the Marbella city council in 2006, a spectacular event that was fol-
lowed by a myriad of local scandals across the country, involving politicians from
across the political spectrum. Over the years, the ramifications of these scandals
gradually worked their way up the scales of the state. From 2009, evidence
emerged of criminal networks specialised in brokering clientelist transactions for
PP’s donors at the regional level. In 2013, serious allegations of corruption
reached the highest echelons of the state with the leak of the “Barcenas papers”,
named after Rajoy’s chief treasurer, Luis Barcenas. These handwritten documents
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detailed the existence of an entire parallel bookkeeping system at the very top of
the party, one that managed the party’s bribe streams on the national scale.
This wave of scandals has had a profound impact in the country’s imaginary,
sparking public debates about the role of clientelism in the Spanish economy,
and creating a chain of associations between corruption and the wave of urban
overdevelopment that crashed the Spanish economy in the wake of 2007. Para-
doxically, these developments have remained remarkably absent from the critical
scholarship that over the last decade has examined Spain’s dramatic experience
with urban entrepreneurialism—a form of urban governance geared towards spa-
tial competition for private capital flows (Charnock et al. 2014; Coq-Huelva 2013;
Delgado Jimenez 2011; Lopez and Rodrıguez 2010). Indeed, on the rare occa-
sions that corruption is cited in this literature, it tends to be explained away as an
“extra-legal ramification” of inter-urban competition; a logical outgrowth of inten-
sified processes of competition for real estate capital. But what is more striking is
that this neglect transcends the Spanish literature. As we shall see, despite dec-
ades of sprawling scholarship, the theme of corruption has been largely neglected
by the main theorists of urban entrepreneurialism as well. All of this poses a series
of questions. First, why has the scholarship on urban entrepreneurialism omitted
the role of corruption despite recurring evidence of its role in the built environ-
ment? Second, how can the analysis of corruption be integrated into the theory
of urban entrepreneurialism? Third, what does the Spanish experience offer, both
theoretically and empirically, to our understanding of how clientelism shapes
urban governance?
To address these issues, this article offers a systematic analysis of the role of
clientelism in Spanish urban entrepreneurialism, arguing that corruption was in
fact constitutive of its political economic dynamics. Far from being a mere off-
shoot of inter-urban competition, the clientelist nexus between the state manage-
rial class and the real estate industry is one that precedes urban
entrepreneurialism and that has a logic of its own. This political structure was cul-
tivated under Franco’s dictatorship in the mid 20th century and was later adapted
to the political dynamics of the liberal democracy that succeeded it in the late
1970s. Through it, corporations competed for political influence to secure their
market success, while political parties competed with each other by raising illicit
funds to boost their campaign resources. Political patrons were incentivised to
inflate their client’s earnings as they usually exacted a previously determined por-
tion of their profits, typically in the form of a 3% kickback. These dynamics then
developed a symbiotic relationship with processes of inter-urban competition at
the turn of the millennium, magnifying processes of real estate speculation at a
time when local boosterism was highly popular amongst the electorate. By then,
these clientelist exchanges were organised into regional, and even national, graft
structures that went beyond the local logic of inter-urban competition.
The first part of the paper focuses on theoretical questions. It explores the omis-
sion of corruption from the literature on urban entrepreneurialism, tracing this
neglect to the state theories that underpin this scholarship. To correct this, the
article turns to critical studies of the “global South”, borrowing the concept of
informality to bring corruption into the analysis of urban entrepreneurialism. The
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second part of the article moves into the Spanish case, identifying the existence
of an “iron triangle of urban entrepreneurialism”: a three-way complex of collud-
ing interests, the vertices of which are the state apparatus, political parties, and
the real estate industry. The analysis starts by fleshing out the role of clientelism
and informality in Spanish state formation, all to contextualise the role of the
“iron triangle” in the Spanish political economy. The paper then unpacks each
one of the “sides” of the triangle, dissecting the links between its vertices: the
institutional mechanisms of clientelism (state-real estate); the criminal nexus
between parties and developers (real estate-parties); and the reproduction of this
kleptocracy (parties-state).
Urban Entrepreneurialism, Corruption, and the State
Theorising the Competitive City: Urban Entrepreneurialism and
Corruption
Over the last three decades, a broad literature has emerged around the concept
of “urban entrepreneurialism”, a concept that explains the intensification of inter-
urban competition in the midst of the rescaling of North Atlantic political econo-
mies.1 The central premise of this literature is that the crisis of postwar political
economies (“Fordist Keynesian regimes”), and their subsequent transition into
neoliberal forms (“Schumpeterian workfare regimes”), was a process that had its
mirror image in the urban sphere (e.g. Brenner 2003, 2004; Harvey 1989; Jessop
1997a, 1997b; Peck and Tickell 2002). Under postwar political economies, North
Atlantic nation-states were equipped with the capacity to coordinate industrial
policy and roll out redistributive measures to offset the territorial imbalances of
uneven development. Back then, urban governments were mainly responsible for
relaying nationally planned policies at the local level. But this “urban managerial-
ism” lost its purpose after the 1970s: as Fordist industry ran out of steam, Keyne-
sian redistributive mechanisms were dismantled, and neoliberal agendas were
“upscaled” to supranational institutions, resulting in a partial loss of de jure sover-
eignty for nation-states. The combined result was that cities and regions came
under growing pressure to raise revenue of their own accord by attracting private
capital flows, resulting in a heightened exposure to territorial competition. To
meet this challenge, there was a trend to devolve or “downscale” the organisa-
tion of growth strategies to competing sub-national units. By the late 1980s,
these pressures had given shape to entrepreneurial patterns of urban governance.
In the incredibly prescient article that popularised the concept, David Harvey
(1989) identified three defining characteristics of this “urban entrepreneurialism”:
(1) a move away from service provision toward place-marketing and local boost-
erism, in order to make areas attractive for investment; (2) a displacement of
rational planning for speculative urban development, often accompanied by local
governments offering to absorb the risks of investors; and (3) the replacement of
top-down forms of government for network-based, public-private partnerships.
The urban entrepreneurialism literature has successfully captured the basic
dynamics of inter-urban competition inaugurated by “globalisation”, inspiring a
vast number of empirical case studies. But there has remained a notable gap in
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this literature: the issue of corruption. In the broadest of terms, corruption
denotes an abuse of entrusted power, though what this specifically means in a
given context is bound to be shaped by struggles over what constitutes accept-
able practice and governance (Doshi and Ranganathan 2019a, 2019b). Here we
will be focusing on “material” and “territorial” forms of corruption, that is, socially
determined abuses over the distribution of resources and space. These forms of
corruption typically require breaches in public mandates to the benefit of private
actors, whether these breaches are administrative (distortion of routine bureau-
cratic procedures) or political (distortion of policy-making procedures) (Heywood
2007).
None of the theorists of urban entrepreneurialism cited above have dedicated
much attention to the role of fraud and clientelism in urban governance. This is
striking considering that corruption dynamics frequently underpin processes of
accumulation through the built environment, not least due to the great depen-
dence of urban development on politically allocated resources (e.g. permits, plan-
ning decisions, public contracts). A notable example is that of the Brazilian
construction firm Odebrecht, which recently admitted before US authorities to
having systematically paid $788 million in bribes across three continents (BBC
2019). It appears that the company even dedicated a fully functioning business
unit to its bribing operations, as if political influence were another factor of pro-
duction. As we shall see, the omission of corruption from Anglo-Saxon theories of
urban entrepreneurialism extends to the literature on Spain as well, which is all
the more striking considering the recent abundance of urban corruption scandals
there.
The question, then, is why has the scholarship on urban entrepreneurialism
neglected the role of corruption in spatial processes of capital accumulation?
The Limits to Functionalism: Urban Entrepreneurialism and the
State
A close inspection reveals that the gap around corruption in the urban
entrepreneurialism scholarship is based on the different conceptualisations of the
state underpinning this scholarship, which are imbued by varying degrees of func-
tionalism. For example, much of Harvey’s work relies on a highly structuralist the-
oretical system of his own creation: the switching circuits of capital (Harvey 1978,
1982:412–445, 2003:108–123). According to this system, urbanisation under
capitalism has a counter-cyclical relationship to industrial overaccumulation.
Whenever profitability thins in the manufacturing sector, what Harvey calls the
primary circuit of capital, capital switches its investment to the built environment,
the secondary circuit, which kicks in like an emergency power supply that keeps
accumulation running.2 In this schema, in which capital is represented as a self-
propelling force, the state merely performs a supportive role. The state either
finances capital’s pre-ordained switch, or enforces it, by removing sources of fric-
tion (e.g. unwelcome regulations, social unrest) or opening new markets for accu-
mulation (e.g. privatisations, imperial expeditions). Harvey’s theory of urban
entrepreneurialism should be seen in light of this system. As patterns of capital
1354 Antipode
ª 2020 The Author. Antipode published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Antipode Foundation Ltd.
accumulation morphed in the wake of the industrial crisis of the 1970s to give a
greater salience to the built environment, urban entrepreneurialism emerged as a
distinct form of statecraft to support this process.
The theory of capital-switching sees the state through a functionalist prism: i.e.
state policy reflects what capital needs. This assumes that the state always acts as
a manager of the collective interests of capital, and as such, renders invisible the
ways in which formal policy channels are distorted by special interests, corruption
included. At the heart of the problem is that neither the state nor capital are
monolithic entities. The state managerial class is always traversed by conflicting
interests, both in a strategic sense (i.e. differing views of how to manage the state)
and in a material sense (i.e. differing forms of class reproduction for different types
of state officials). Likewise, the bourgeoisie is split into fractions (e.g. landowners
vs. developers, small businesses vs. transnational corporations, etc.) and their
political interests only rarely align. The implications of this complexity for any the-
ory of the state are two-fold. First, the idea of a state acting in unison on behalf of
the collective interests of capital is highly implausible. To be sure, capitalist states do
custody the reproduction of capital accumulation—at the very least to preserve
their own political continuity—however, they never do so in the abstract, but
rather, by attending concrete political dilemmas that always require them to make
strategic choices and prioritise certain interests over others. Second, we should not
take the impartiality of capitalist states at face value. Though capitalist states rule
through formally impartial channels, the fact that state institutions are always tra-
versed by political contradictions means that state officials will be pressured to
bend, circumvent, or subvert formal rules in order to further their own goals. This
requires us to take seriously the fact that, beneath an outward image of state
autonomy, there are groups furthering their agendas through informal, clientelist
means.
Neo-Gramscian state perspectives are better positioned to grasp this complex-
ity. Bob Jessop’s extensive writings have repositioned the concept of urban
entrepreneurialism upon a wholly different theoretical platform: his own “strate-
gic-relational” theory of the state (Jessop 1997a, 1997b).3 Jessop represents the
state as a malleable battlefield, one being constantly reshaped by political conflict,
such as the clash between different fractions of capital for the representation of
their interests. For Jessop, the capacity of states to manage the reproduction of
capital cannot be taken for granted—on the contrary, this is precisely what needs
explaining. To be operational, states need to find ways to suspend (or at least,
contain) the conflicts that traverse them. This requires two types of political
efforts: state projects, to unite the state managerial class around a coherent institu-
tional apparatus; and hegemonic projects, to resolve conflicts between particular
interests and the general interest (Jessop 1990:9, 161). The strategic-relational
approach has the potential to open up room to account for the politics of corrup-
tion. For example, Jessop insists that hegemonic projects will continue to privilege
the “economic-corporate” needs of a dominant class or class fraction so long as
this does not threaten the continuity of the hegemonic order.
Yet, paradoxically, neither Jessop nor his followers (e.g. Brenner 2003, 2004)
have given much attention to corruption, which raises the question of what has
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prevented them from doing so. In his books on state theory, Jessop has dedicated
brief discussions to the politics of clientelism, which he defines as “the exchange
of political support in return for favourable allocation of politically mediated
resources” (see Jessop 1990:162, 2015:62). In these discussions, he explains away
clientelism as an exceptional and inherently unsustainable mode of governance.
To support this claim, Jessop relapses on a functionalist form of reasoning:
because oligarchic capture may weaken the state’s transformative capacity (state
project failure) and/or result in a hegemonic crisis (hegemonic project failure),
“[n]either situation can be said to favour the reproduction of capital in general,
and it is therefore in the political interests of capital to press for the transforma-
tion of the state” (Jessop 1990:162). As we shall see, this logical deduction is con-
tradicted by historical evidence: long-term capitalist growth appears to be
perfectly compatible with clientelist modes of governance.
A further problem lies in Jessop’s representation of the state managerial class,
to which he seems to afford a degree of functional coherence that he refuses to
other classes. Jessop operates under the supposition that it is in the interest of
state managers to safeguard the formal structures of the state, sometimes describ-
ing them as guardians of state unity in periods of hegemonic instability (Jessop
1990:9). But this neglects how the state managerial class is composed of different
fractions—career bureaucrats, politically appointed administrators, elected politi-
cians—and these have different dynamics of class reproduction. By extension, it
also neglects how the different elements within the state managerial class often
resort to informal means to ensure their own reproduction.
The next step, then, is to make adjustments to the strategic-relational prism so
that it can cast light on the ways in which state power is exercised beyond the
structures of legality. Only in this way will we be able to render visible the role of
corruption in the governance of urban capitalism.
The Informal Dimensions of State Power: Corruption and the
State
Corruption and clientelism have long been framed as antithetical to a proper
functioning of the market. Mainstream corruption discourses are shaped by mod-
ernisation theory, which sees corruption as a symptom of incomplete capitalist
development (for an excellent review, see Doshi and Ranganathan 2019a,
2019b). During the Cold War, the source of corruption was identified in the
legacy of pre-modern patrimonialism, which resulted in a blurred separation
between the public and private realms. This discourse was reformulated in the
1990s, in the context of the neoliberal push for market-driven reforms in “devel-
oping economies”. From then on, the source of incomplete development became
an insufficient degree of market discipline, which left unrestrained the supposedly
inherent “rent-seeking behaviour” of government officials. As is often the case,
the techniques of domination tested out on the “South” were soon redeployed
against the popular classes of the “North”. At the turn of the 2010s, European
elites navigated the Eurozone crisis by scapegoating the countries of the conti-
nent’s “periphery”—mainly the European South—which were said to be dragging
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the whole continent down due to the immaturity of their social formations (Doo-
ley 2018). Articulated in terms of cultural dysfunctionality, the immaturity dis-
course was deployed to instil market discipline on the profligate and corrupt
societies of the European south.
Against this, most critical scholars (rightly) shifted the blame onto the Euro-
zone’s institutional architecture, which in the decade preceding the crisis devas-
tated the industrial base of the South and locked Mediterranean countries in a
cycle of debt-led growth (Charnock et al. 2014:79–81). The problem is that the
dynamic of this debate has encouraged many authors to downplay the impact of
corruption in the countries of the European South, Spain included. The point
should not be to deny the material existence of these abuses, as this only
obscures the realities of class domination, but to reframe our approach to corrup-
tion in a more constructive way. To do so, we have much to learn from the criti-
cal scholarship on the so-called “global South”. The reaction against mainstream
corruption discourses by critical analysts of the global South has not been to
downplay the existence of corruption, but to craft a repertoire of theoretical
strategies to integrate the study of corruption into critical scholarship.
For our purposes, we must highlight three of these insights (see Doshi and Ran-
ganathan 2019b). First, this literature has highlighted how the culturalist/racialised
character of mainstream corruption discourses has served to overlook the existence of
corruption in “developed” countries. To bring this back to Europe, rather than
explaining away the role of corruption in the periphery, one could simply point
out the evidence of analogous practices in the core. For example, only last year,
the Austrian government fell after the leader of the junior coalition party (the far-
right FP €O) was filmed trading public contracts and privatisations to a Russian con-
struction company that was offering financial and media support for his party
(Opratko 2019). Second, some scholars have pointed to the lack of evidence sustain-
ing the claim that corruption hampers market success. A frequently cited example is
the accelerated growth of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, where state-
sanctioned forms of “crony capitalism” were pivotal in their developmental strate-
gies (Kang 2002). Third, there is a broad consensus that corruption cannot be anal-
ysed, let alone addressed, without careful reflection on histories of state formation
(Doshi and Ranganathan 2019b). The role of corruption in a social formation can-
not be theorised in the abstract, because corruption is a complex phenomenon
that refracts social relations in multiple ways. As such, it needs to be understood
in relation to the specific historical and political dynamics of a given social forma-
tion.
To build these insights into a theoretical framework, the notion “informality”
provides a useful conceptual tool (Haid and Hilbrandt 2019; Roy 2005). Informal-
ity highlights how power is exercised in ways that go beyond the formal realm of
the law, either because these are extra-legal outright, or because they involve a
flexible deployment of existing laws and regulations. Importantly, the concept
highlights the mutual constitution of formality and informality—the informal is
always a “state of exception” created by the formal actions of the state. Despite
its broadness, the concept is helpful insofar as it casts light on the interstices of
the public–private divide, where a growing amount of decisions are made, even
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in the “global North”. In the sphere of real estate, for example, the concept has
been deployed to describe the unplanned outgrowth of urban areas, the usurpa-
tion of land by developers with the acquiescence of the state, or the creation of
para-statal vehicles to fast track urban development, which is a typical feature of
urban entrepreneurialism (see Doshi and Ranganathan 2019b). At a methodologi-
cal level, the concept forces us to not take for granted the formal legal structures
of the state, and as such, helps us challenge “the myth of formality in the global
North” (Jaffe and Koster 2019).
To sum up: in the same way that the theory of urban entrepreneurialism needs
strategic relationism to highlight the political conflict involved in inter-urban com-
petition, strategic relationism needs to integrate the informal dimensions of state
power into its outlook if it is to ever account for the role of corruption in the gov-
ernance of the built environment. The remainder of the article will illustrate this
theoretical synthesis through a systematic analysis of the role of clientelism in
Spanish urban entrepreneurialism.
The Iron Triangle of Urban Entrepreneurialism in Spain
Urban Entrepreneurialism in Spain
Over the last decade, a number of studies have borrowed the insights of the
urban entrepreneurialism literature to theorise the rise of inter-urban competition
in Spain and its impact on Spanish capitalism more broadly (Charnock et al.
2014; Coq-Huelva 2013; Delgado Jimenez 2011; Lopez and Rodrıguez 2010).4
For all their differences, a common narrative can be discerned in these studies.
The story begins with a crisis in the primary circuit of capital: the exhaustion of
the industrial-developmental project of Franco’s dictatorship in the 1970s. With
the collapse and dismantlement of large swathes of Spain’s industrial base, the
secondary circuit kicked in. Private investment relocated to real estate in the
1980s, a turn that was actively supported by the state through housing policy,
land-use planning reforms, and financial regulations. The process coincided with
Spain’s transition into liberal democracy, which brought a dramatic rescaling of
the state apparatus: Franco’s unitary state devolved vast competences over the
built environment to a quasi-federal structure, one composed of 17 regional gov-
ernments and a pluriverse of municipal democracies. This state restructuring, cou-
pled with Spain’s growing exposure to European capital after joining the EEC in
1986, intensified processes of inter-urban and inter-regional competition for pri-
vate capital flows, setting in motion processes of urban overproduction. The logi-
cal culmination of this process was the spectacular real estate bubble that crashed
the Spanish economy in 2007–2013.
The notion of urban entrepreneurialism certainly captures well the boom in
place-marketing of these years. Patterns of inter-urban competition as theorised
by Harvey became first discernible from the early 1990s, with the most paradig-
matic cases being hosting of the Olympic Games in Barcelona, or the opening of
a Guggenheim Museum in post-industrial Bilbao. Yet, it was at the turn of the
millennium when urban entrepreneurialism came into full swing and its logic
began to filter down to even the smallest municipalities. The legislation of a new
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national land-use planning framework in 1997–1998 (the so-called “build-any-
where law’) jumpstarted a property boom that was then turbocharged with Euro-
zone finance in the early 2000s. The result was a “prodigious decade” for Spanish
residential capitalism: nine million property transactions; six million new homes;
and 50% new job posts, the majority in the service and construction industries
(Lopez and Rodrıguez 2010:250; von Zeschau 2011). In the face of these market
opportunities, a “boomtown mentality” swept the country. Local governments
began to build electoral coalitions around urban development projects to attract
private investment into their areas. To put their cities “on the map”, municipali-
ties became eager to upgrade their position within “the spatial division of con-
sumption” (Harvey 1989:9): by encouraging tourism, gentrification, the
construction of spectacular buildings, or hosting cultural events. Since most prop-
erty buyers sought beach-side properties along the Mediterranean Coast, the phe-
nomenon was particularly acute in the eastern and southern seaboards of the
country. The mayor of Villajoiosa, a small town on the coast of Alicante, put it this
way: “Every town in our area is succeeding and everyone is growing rich. We can-
not afford to stand still” (quoted in Burriel de Orueta 2008).
Like their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, however, studies of Spanish urban
entrepreneurialism have neglected the role of corruption in spatial processes of
capital accumulation, a curious omission given how corruption and urban devel-
opment have become almost synonymous in the country’s public imaginary after
a decade of relentless scandal. A simple word search reveals that Charnock et al.
(2014) do not award the term “corruption” a single mention in their book,
whereas Lopez and Rodrıguez (2010) only afford it a handful of passing mentions
in their 500-page study. And in the rare occasions that corruption is mentioned,
it tends to be described as a logical outgrowth of urban entrepreneurialism:
The fiscal weakness of municipalities and their dependence on the evolution of real
estate markets has tended to subordinate their autonomy to that of corporate agents
just as a large part of corporate profits have come to gravitate around local govern-
ment decisions. The over-abundance of corruption cases in recent years is only the extra-
legal ramification of this mutual dependence. (Lopez and Rodrıguez 2010:354, emphasis
added)
Corruption, then, appears as a functional phenomenon, a symbiotic relationship
between local states and developers in a context of intensified competition for
real estate capital.5
Though this partly explains why so many municipalities were willing to neglect
checks and balances to attract property developers, it does not account for the
full scale of political corruption in Spain. By now there is considerable evidence
that local clientelism was coordinated at the regional and even national levels by
criminal structures tied to the financing of political parties. In 2009, it emerged
that a criminal network had been brokering local clientelist transactions between
corporations and the conservative Partido Popular (PP) across the Valencian region.
Subsequent investigations showed that this particular criminal organisation (the
“G€urtel network”) had also penetrated other regions (Madrid, Galicia), where
other networks of this sort existed as well (Jimenez and Villoria 2012). After 2013,
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evidence from the Barcenas papers suggested that what had previously appeared
as local bribing scandals were in fact part of a broader graft system fused onto
the party’s national financial apparatus (Gallero 2016). Put differently, what ini-
tially seemed like local disconnected affairs were in fact tied together by a broader
system of illicit party finance that went beyond the logic of inter-urban competi-
tion.
As with the main theorists of urban entrepreneurialism, the neglect of corrup-
tion in these studies is symptomatic of a difficulty to accommodate it in the
model of state–capital relations built into the theory of capital switching. In these
studies, the Spanish state’s efforts to channel investment towards the built envi-
ronment from the 1980s appear as a way of managing the needs of capital as a
whole. Yet, often forgotten in this literature is that attempts to stimulate the real
estate industry in Spain from the 1980s onwards emerged not only to reinvigo-
rate capital accumulation in the abstract, but also out of concrete efforts to tackle
a mounting housing deficit, curtail house-price increases, and find employment
for an unruly proletariat (Pedro 2001:273–299). In other words, if state managers
opened the floodgates of investment on the built environment, they did so to
address political priorities in a strategic manner. In a similar vein, the Spanish rul-
ing class’ tendency to engage in corruption cannot be understood through the
mechanics of capital switching, but rather as the product of a historical clientelist
structure, one that compels political parties to compete with each other by raising
campaign finance through bribery, as it simultaneously pressures corporations to
buy political influence in order to compete over state-allocated resources.
Clientelism and Informality in Spanish State Formation
As indicated earlier, any analysis of corruption in any given political economy
must stem out of a historical analysis of state formation. This section will do so
while teasing out the role of the informal in the governance of the built environ-
ment, an analysis that will prove necessary to understand the dynamics of urban
corruption in contemporary Spain.
Clientelism in modern Spanish politics has a long history, but the contemporary
symbiosis between the state managerial class and the real estate industry traces
its origins to the fascist dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939–1975). At the time,
clientelist exchanges were a common practice across the dictatorship’s opaque
bureaucracy, as state officials frequently traded bribes for vital administrative pro-
cedures (Cardesın 2016:286). The realm of construction and real estate was one
of the most permeated by clientelist exchanges. To enter the market, developers
had to acquire a politically allocated license, and once in, the “friendliest” were
rewarded with public construction contracts, tailored urban development plans,
or even the lease of prisoners to work on construction sites. In this environment,
construction firms were compelled to develop strong personal and professional
ties with the dictatorship’s elites in order to prevent being outflanked by better-
connected competitors. As such, clientelism became the informal means through
which select firms could secure commercial success in an illiberal state.
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The informal nexus between state and real estate expanded dramatically after
1959, when the regime embarked in a national-developmentalist project that
inaugurated a generalised “state of exception” in urbanistic affairs. The urgency
to expand the country’s industrial base required the construction of as many
working-class dwellings as possible, with little regard for quality or surrounding
urban infrastructure (Pollard 2009). To support a rapidly expanding construction
industry, the government did not hesitate to engage in frequent breaches of
legality. Indeed, the central state got into the habit of overruling local planning
considerations so that housing could stretch into poorly connected industrial
parks, to the point that cities began to sprawl in oil-spill shapes that did not
match official planning projections (Naredo 2010; Neuman 2010:110–116).
This pattern of urbanisation spurred a powerful backlash from the late 1960s,
when grassroots urban activists (the movimiento vecinal or “neighbourhood move-
ment") began to demand better living conditions for working-class urban dwell-
ers. Despite the movement’s ties with the outlawed Partido Comunista, the
movement became so strong that government officials were forced to settle plan-
ning decisions with its leaders in informal negotiations. In Madrid, this effectively
established an alternative clientelist system to represent the interests of the urban
poor (Neuman 2010:113–116). The ultimate political demand of this movement
was the devolution and democratisation of the local state, so that self-governed
communities could ensure their access to public services, infrastructure, and cul-
ture (Martınez i Muntada 2011).
After the end of the dictatorship, these demands were engraved in the Consti-
tution of 1978, which set in motion a broader rescaling of the state apparatus.
Vast competences over land-use planning and housing were transferred to a new
quasi-federal structure of 17 regional governments. However, most power over
the built environment was devolved to the municipalities, to be ruled by demo-
cratically elected governments (Coq-Huelva 2013:1220–1223). In addition, from
1985 local councils were granted executive powers over their local savings banks
(cajas de ahorro), credit institutions that specialised in the financing of real estate.
This extension of devolution acted as a hegemonic project to appease cultural
minorities and working class activists, but also as a state project to unify the state
apparatus under the command of the then dominant Partido Socialista, as it
replaced large swathes of the old fascist administration with elected officials
(Cardesın 2016:292–296).
As the vigilance of the neighbourhood movement fizzled out over time, the
new political elite engaged in power grabs that deformed the new municipal
democracies into elective dictatorships. Formally, the Constitution equipped the
local state with a permanent bureaucracy to supervise the new local governments,
but these bureaucratic positions were often left vacant and their roles passed onto
temporary clerical workers that were employed by the local civil service (Garcıa
Quesada et al. 2013:624–627). This was a fragrant conflict of interest, as it ren-
dered the supervisors dependent upon their supervisees for their salary and work-
ing conditions. Moreover, to further remove themselves from the purview of
administrative law, some local executives began to outsource public management
functions to private external bodies, all under the neoliberal pretence of lifting the
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dead hand of the state. The most resounding case is that of Marbella, where
between 1991 and 2006 the city council created a parallel administration of pri-
vate companies and foundations that was filled with handpicked friends and rela-
tives until it became larger than the official bureaucracy itself (Garcıa Quesada
et al. 2013:628).
In this context, the corruption of the Franco years was never really uprooted, it
merely adapted to the new shape of the state. The new liberal democracy
devolved decision-making power to a myriad of regional and local nodes, and
created a political elite under permanent electoral competition for the control of
these nodes. Yet, in the absence of effective checks and balances, the new politi-
cal structure spawned new forms of corruption: old patterns of clientelism in the
real estate market were now joined by an additional form of clientelism in the
electoral arena, according to which political parties were compelled to exact bribe
monies in order to expand their campaign capacities—or else risk being overrun
by their rivals. Put differently, now state officials not only sought bribes to enrich
themselves, but also to reproduce their class power over the state.
These clientelist dynamics, thus, cannot be seen as a functional outgrowth of
urban entrepreneurialism—on the contrary, they preceded it and facilitated its
emergence. By the time the property bubble took off at the turn of the millen-
nium, Spain had already in place a historically grown clientelist structure mediat-
ing between state and capital, one with a logic of its own. This informal structure
can be imagined as an “iron triangle”, in the American sense of a “complex” of
colluding interests. The three vertices of this triangle are: (1) the state apparatus;
(2) the construction industry; and (3) political parties, all joined together by different
forms of informality, from the illicit use of public power for private gain outright,
to the bending of existing regulations and exploitation of legal grey areas. The
following sections will explain the workings of this informal political structure by
examining each one of the “sides” of this triangle in turn.
First Side: The Institutional Mechanisms of Clientelism
The studies of the Spanish crash alluded to earlier have only acknowledged the
existence of the first side of the triangle, the clientelist connection between the
state (vertex 1) and the construction industry (vertex 2). However, these studies
have not provided much detail about how the mechanics of these exchanges
worked. It is thus worth doing a quick survey of the patterns of political corrup-
tion around Spanish urban development. Most can be categorised according to a
triad of clientelist transactions: (1) urbanistic; (2) contractual; and (3) financial.
Urbanistic clientelism revolves around the manipulation of the market potential
of the land. The peculiarities of Spanish urban planning grant local governments
a great degree of discretion in the distribution of the economic power of land.
When classifying land as fit for urban development, local governments estimate
the worth of the re-zoned land assets as if these had already been fully developed
and then fix their value by law (Fernandez 2005; Marcinkoski 2016:68–72). As
per the “build-anywhere” law of 1997–1998, the procedure to calculate this value
was the so-called “residual method”, according to which the costs of production
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are subtracted from an estimate of the potential market value of the final real-
estate asset, using average house prices as a benchmark. As property prices
boomed in the 2000s, the price differentials reaped from these re-zoning proce-
dures became immense. Fernandez (2005) has estimated that re-zoning opera-
tions would prompt land asset prices to escalate, on average, between 2000%
and 6500%. This political mechanism of asset-price inflation sustained land (and
thus, house) prices high during the years of the bubble, acting as a remarkable
instrument for urban entrepreneurialism. Unsurprisingly, this procedure also
became a formidable breeding ground of clientelism. Numerous corruption cases
involve politicians using these powers informally, to reward friends and family (or
even themselves) with a re-zoning of their land assets, or to give developers a tip-
off of an impending reclassification so that they could purchase rural lands ahead
of time.
Clientelism in land-use planning also revolves around the capture of regulatory
procedures to facilitate the approval of construction projects. During the bubble,
this often came attached to the opaque practice of “urbanistic agreements” (con-
venios urbanısticos)—perhaps the most evident instance of informality being built
into Spanish urban governance. Largely unregulated until 2007, these procedures
allowed local governments to tailor urban plan amendments to the interests of
specific developers. In exchange, local governments would demand that develop-
ers included some sort of facility to the benefit of their electorates: e.g. a local
care home or a municipal sports centre (Garcıa Quesada et al. 2013:623). Negoti-
ations of these agreements would unfold in a bilateral fashion and without any
minimum requirements for transparency. The content was usually withheld from
the public and sometimes from the local state itself.
In addition, urbanistic clientelism also involves the deliberate neglect of environ-
mental controls, generally by overlooking the ecological impact of urban develop-
ment projects. Rather than exploiting a legal grey area, the kind of informality
involved in these transactions typically involved bending the letter of the law. For
example, whereas regulations forced local governments to commission reports on
the environmental impact of urban developments, these same regulations did not
specify that they had to take heed of those reports (Ordo~nez 2016). The prolifera-
tion of golf courses in provinces at risk of desertification is a good indication of
where environmental assessments have been wilfully ignored.
Contractual clientelism involves distortions in the legal procedures to allocate
public contracts. The marks of contractual clientelism are most evident in the
acceptance of additional expenditures in public contracts (sobrecostes). It is not
uncommon for adjudicating authorities to assume the unforeseen costs of their
contractors, a practice that can inflate the original value of a project several times
over. The most resounding examples are found in large-scale infrastructure con-
tracts, almost invariably to the benefit of Spain’s largest construction conglomer-
ates. A notorious case is Valencia’s City of Arts and Sciences, a complex of futuristic
buildings built that became the flagship of the city’s entrepreneurial project.
Though the original budget was €382m, it ended up costing the Valencian regio-
nal government €1.28bn (Serra 2015).
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Another mechanism of contractual clientelism is the rigging of design contests.
This refers to the ways in which supposedly competitive contests for the adjudica-
tion of public contracts are manipulated to favour specific companies. This distor-
tion typically involves the informal manipulation of technical reports to arbitrarily
inflate the score of a design project. An ongoing case investigates the role of the
Aragonese regional government in the rigging of a design contest to adjudicate
the development of an industrial park to a large conglomerate called Acciona.
Email evidence suggests that the contest’s technical director had orders from his
superiors to use discretionary criteria available to him to “readjust” the score of
Acciona’s offer (Lopez-Fonseca and Monta~no 2014). The Aragonese government
would later pay the company €150m in unforeseen costs, a sum that allegedly
financed the kickbacks for the officials involved in the rigging of the contest.
Finally, financial clientelism relies on corporate malpractice in the banking sector,
generally through the politically controlled savings banks (cajas de ahorro). In the
1980s local councils were allowed to handpick a large section of the executive
boards of their local cajas, and in the 1990s some regional governments began
to stretch their power into these bodies as well. According to the estimates of an
IMF (2012:8) report, by 2009, out of 43 savings banks at least 16 granted politi-
cal representatives a 40–50% share of voting powers in their corporate govern-
ments. It was not uncommon for property developers benefitting from certain
urban planning decisions to then finance their building operations with loans
from a local caja controlled by their same political patrons or their party friends
(Coq-Huelva 2013:1223–1226).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these credit institutions also acted as reckless financiers
of local and regional strategies of urban entrepreneurialism during the bubble,
resulting in “a delirious cycle of development proposals, municipal approvals, and
easy credit lubricating this urban transformation” (Marcinkoski 2016:72). The
Bank of Spain would describe Valencia’s Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (CAM)
as “the worst of the worst” (Biot 2012). This caja would accompany its regional
government in all sorts of extravagant projects (including the aforementioned City
of Arts and Sciences). This was rooted in informal complicity: CAM was in the habit
of loaning credit at very low interest (sometimes 0%) to its very own board mem-
bers, a malpractice that the regional government, the official regulator, neglected
to flag.
Second Side: The Party–Developer Nexus
Having examined the institutional mechanisms of clientelism, the next step is to
explore the connection between the construction industry (vertex 2) and political
parties (vertex 3), an informal nexus that organised clientelist exchanges above
and beyond the local logic of urban entrepreneurialism. Over the last decade, the
majority of political corruption cases have involved illicit payments not just to the
public officials providing the political favours but also to their political parties. The
informal nature of these financial transactions did not preclude their systematisa-
tion. Political parties farmed out their bribe-collecting activities to specialised crim-
inal networks, ran by a mixture of high-ranking party members and
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businesspeople. The main purpose of these informal networks was to broker
between parties and developers, collecting tolls on the channels of influence that
they facilitated, usually 3% of the profits of the rewarded company—i.e. a “kick-
back”. These bribe monies were then split between the criminal networks broker-
ing the transaction, the political officials making the necessary decisions, and the
financial hierarchies of their political parties.
The foremost example of a political organisation corroded by these practices is
the conservative Partido Popular (PP). Some of the earliest evidence surfaced in
1992 (the Naseiro affair, named after the party’s chief treasurer at the time). The
scandal was unearthed by intercepted phone conversations between politicians,
who were openly discussing the bribes that the party was receiving in exchange
for public decisions (Gallero 2016:137–148). The conversations also suggested
the existence of internal power struggles to control these illicit revenue streams,
as well as the awareness of the party’s national superstructure of the existence of
these practices. Everything points to the continuity, extension, and systematisa-
tion of these practices until their resurfacing in the scandals of the 2010s. Police
reports openly speak of an uninterrupted continuum between the practices of the
Naseiro scandal and the more recent Barcenas affair, which, as addressed in the
opening, revealed the existence of an entire informal bookkeeping system to
manage the party’s bribe streams on a national scale (Gallero 2016:145).
Over the course of the last decade, successive police operations have uncovered
the existence of several criminal networks acting as intermediaries between PP
and its illicit donors. Perhaps the most infamous is the so-called “G€urtel network”,
a criminal organisation formed by businessmen and high-ranking party members
that operated in the Valencia, Madrid, and Galicia regions. The network cultivated
relationships with party members in government positions and used their own
companies as a front to disguise the party’s election campaign activities with false
invoices (El Mundo 2010). In exchange, the network demanded political favours,
either for their own companies or for the companies that had contracted their
brokering services, from which they would exact part of their profits.
In the midst of the “Taula affair”, a more recent scandal relating to the finances
of the Valencian branch of the party, the leader of one such intermediary network
admitted in court to having brokered hundreds of clientelist transactions, claims
later corroborated by 12 different “donors” (EFE 2016). During his testimony, he
claimed to have exacted 2–3% on the profits of the companies rewarded in every
transaction, part of which went straight into the party’s coffers. Interestingly, he
detailed how bribe revenues were then distributed by the party to five different
slush funds in the Valencian region alone: one slush fund stored the party’s local
branch in the city of Valencia, the region’s capital; three would have corre-
sponded to the party’s provincial branches in the regions; and one final fund was
managed by the party’s regional structure, rising above the others and feeding
off from them (Zafra 2016). Witnesses to the Taula affair also claimed in court
that the Valencian regional slush fund in turn fed into the one managed by Barce-
nas at the national level, suggesting the existence of a bribe-collection hierarchy
fused onto the financial apparatus of the party, from the bottom to the top. This
would corroborate the claim made by Barcenas himself that “PP ran a slush fund
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in every region and every province for electoral expenses” (quoted in Martialay
2014).6
Though evidence of similar practices in other parties is not lacking, it remains
unclear to what extent other parties developed informal systems of criminal
finance as large and as comprehensive as that of PP. The closest examples are
perhaps the scandals surrounding the Catalan nationalist party Convergencia i
Unio, an organisation accused of the systematic exaction of 3% in kickbacks from
public contractors in Catalonia. Though the bribe-farming systems of Con-
vergencia bear remarkable similarities to that of PP, one striking difference is that
in this case part of this graft would have also gone to relatives of the party leader,
like a mafia family (eldiario.es 2017). In the case of Spain’s main social-democratic
party, Partido Socialista (PSOE), despite having been involved in all too familiar
clientelist transactions at the local and regional level during the years of the bub-
ble, evidence of a system of criminal finance as widespread as that of PP has yet
to emerge. To be sure, there is plenty of evidence that the party was engaged in
practices identical to those of PP during the 1990s. For example, the following
headline story opened the newspaper El Paıs in 1991:
On Wednesday, the Minister for Public Works, Josep Borrell, convened the CEOs of
the largest construction companies in his office to urge them, “on behalf of the Prime
Minister and myself”, to stop making illicit payments to political parties in exchange
for construction contracts ... Borrell was adamant and insisted that if any of the com-
panies gathered there received illicit proposals “in the name of PSOE” [his party] they
should communicate this to him directly ... Sources from the construction sector
admit that the payment of bribes, between 2% and 4% of the value of the project, is
a common practice in the allocation of public contracts. This corruption extended to
every level of the state administration: national, regional, and municipal ... In the sec-
tor, frequent comments are made about the differential costs of graft across local and
regional governments. (Misse 1991)
Reminded about the headline in a recent televised interview, Borrell himself made
the following observation: “... it seems evident that the more a party holds power
at the local level, the more these phenomena proliferate, sometimes not as iso-
lated cases, but as organised party structures involving many people at once”
(see Evole 2016).
Third Side: The Reproduction of the Kleptocracy
As addressed earlier, part of these bribe monies went to their brokers as a fee,
part went to the politicians pushing levers of the state to favour the briber, and
part went into the coffers of the politician’s political party (hence the convenience
of the 3% figure). In the case of PP, these bribe moneys went to a local slush
fund and were then distributed up the party’s territorial scales, nourishing a hier-
archy of provincial, regional, and national slush funds. The Barcenas papers, the
parallel bookkeeping system designed to manage the national slush fund, indi-
cates how these illicit cash pools were put to use: informal bonuses to the leader-
ship—ensuring the collusion of the upper echelons at large—and systematic
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campaign spending fraud (Mercado et al. 2013). This last outflow seems to have
been the main purpose of the entire structure, a form of electoral “doping”
designed to reproduce the party’s access to the nodes of state power by informal
means. This form of political accumulation constitutes the third side of the iron
triangle, the one that connects political parties (vertex 2) to the state (vertex 3).
Campaign spending fraud is made fairly easy by a number of loopholes in the
Spanish party finance system. In theory, Spanish political parties ought to finance
themselves through a system of public subsidies proportional to the degree of
representation that they achieve (Jimenez and Villoria 2012:127–129). Established
in 1977 with the aim of supporting the country’s nascent liberal democracy, this
system left a number of legal ambiguities when it came to private donations that
legislators have been reluctant to address ever since. The first regulations were
introduced in the mid-1980s, when private contributions were capped at a cer-
tain amount per donor each year, and state contractors were banned from mak-
ing contributions due to conflict of interest (Jimenez and Villoria 2012:127).
However, the practice of anonymous donations persisted, allowing parties to sim-
ply split large donations into several unidentified contributions.
Moreover, although the official accounts that parties report reflect that around
80–95% of their finances come from public subsidies, there are plenty of “back
doors” to conceal much larger sources of informal funds. The finances of political
parties fall under the purview of the Court of Audit (Tribunal de Cuentas), an insti-
tution equipped with scarcely dissuasive sanctions and self-defeating legal techni-
calities. Perhaps the most striking is that a political party is not legally regarded as
a single financial unit comprising all its different territorial organisations. This
means that the accounts that parties submit to the Court do not automatically
include party foundations, associated companies, or local party branches. This
legal multiplicity has allowed them to easily evade the purview of the state by
simply moving funds around (Jimenez and Villoria 2012).
The easiest way to mask funds in this manner is through party foundations or
shell companies. Conveniently, different rules apply to party foundations with
regard to private donations. Not only is there a higher cap on contributions, but
foundations are also exempt from the rule that bans public contractors from
donating to political parties as well as from the “cooling-off” period, designed to
avoid the arrival of delayed payments derived from clientelist transactions
(Jimenez and Villoria 2012:130–131). In the 1980s, it was common for donors to
commission generic reports to a shell company that would then funnel the pay-
ment into the party’s coffers. This fraudulent practice was at the epicentre of the
two main political finance scandals of the 1990s: the Naseiro affair (1992), and
the Filesa affair (1991–1997), which struck, respectively, the conservative PP and
the social-democratic PSOE (Heywood 2007). A more recent example is the
“Palau affair” afflicting the Catalan nationalist party CiU, in which companies
awarded with public contracts by the Catalan government made large contribu-
tions to the party’s foundation that were undisclosed to the Court of Audit (el-
diario.es 2017). However, as explained earlier, shell companies, rather than party
foundations, were the preferred mode of disguise in PP’s more recent scandals.
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The exact extent to which these practices were used during the years of the
bubble is a question that is bound to remain unanswered. But one indicator
should capture our imagination: the vast amount of €500 notes in circulation in
these years. This denomination, with little practical everyday use for most people,
was standard in money laundering and bribing operations. Spain gathered 26%
of the Eurozone’s total at the peak of the bubble in 2006 (Lazaro 2016). Even
though this figure reflects broader illicit transactions as well, it nevertheless points
to the intrinsic connection between “dirty money” and urban development.
During the 2000s, many local candidates ran electoral campaigns boosted by
the bribes of developers, something that reinforced conflicts of interest in urban
planning and created patterns of competition between parties over criminal
sources of finance. This created a perverse structure of incentives, according to
which entire party structures derived illicit electoral finance from inflating the
profits of the construction industry by informal means. In turn, parties derived a
competitive edge from this criminal political economy, as it enabled higher cam-
paign spending. In the process, the local urban planning office (concejalıa de
urbanismo) became a highly strategic institution for these processes of political
accumulation. This issue was openly addressed in a recent televised interview
involving several formerly high-ranking political figures (see Evole 2016). Dis-
cussing the problem of widespread political corruption in urban development,
Josep Pique, a man who occupied several cabinet positions at the turn of the mil-
lennium before joining the ranks of the construction industry, made the following
remark: “In local councils, where there is a strong tradition of forming coalition
governments, the junior partner tends to always demand...” “The urban planning
office”—the sentence is finished by Esperanza Aguirre, head of the Madrid region
between 2003 and 2012. Pique concludes sarcastically: “What a coincidence.”
Conclusion
The literature of “urban entrepreneurialism” has successfully captured the dynam-
ics of inter-urban competition that have arisen in the wake of neoliberal globalisa-
tion; however, it has proved unable to grasp the role of corruption in the
governance of the built environment. This is due to this concept’s emphasis on
the role of the state in managing the reproduction of the capitalist economy as a
whole, which inflects a functionalist bent onto the different theories of the state
that underpin it. These end up exaggerating the coherence of the state appara-
tus, taking at face value the capitalist state’s hegemonic self-representation as an
impartial arbiter of competing interests. Not only is the capitalist class ridden with
factionalism, as the strategic-relational versions of urban entrepreneurialism
already demonstrate, but so is the state managerial class as well. This means that
state managers have class interests of their own that should be factored into the
analysis, since their abuse of entrusted power is often not just about personal
gain, but about ensuring their class reproduction as well.
The difficulty to integrate this complexity into the study of urban entrepreneuri-
alism is patent in the literature on Spain, where a number of sophisticated studies
have explored this phenomenon in the country but have been unable to factor
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corruption into their accounts despite overwhelming evidence. Tellingly, on the
few occasions that corruption is mentioned, it is simply assumed to be a func-
tional expression of inter-urban competition—i.e. it helped local states attract
investment.
As the article has argued, the study of urban governance can address these
issues by drawing methodological insights from studies of the “global South”,
which have developed a repertoire of theoretical strategies to account for corrup-
tion in critical ways. From this toolkit, the concept of “informality” is particularly
useful, as it casts light on the manifold ways in which state power is exercised by
bending, twisting and circumventing formal legal rules. Factoring informality into
a strategic-relational approach to the state—one that not only addresses inter-
capitalist competition for state influence, but also the dynamics of class reproduc-
tion of state managers—is a good start to tease out how corruption often embeds
itself into the governance of the built environment. However, this must always be
grounded in a careful historicisation of state formation in the political economy in
question, since apparently similar corruption practices can mean a variety of
things and fulfil divergent social roles across different contexts.
These theoretical points have been showcased with an analysis of the role of
clientelism in Spanish urban entrepreneurialism. Contrary to much of the litera-
ture, this article has shown the existence of a clientelist structure that, informally
but systematically, organised the colluding interests of state, political parties, and
the real estate industry—what has been referred to as an “iron triangle of real
estate”. The analysis has traced the origins and evolution of this informal structure
to the shifting forms of the Spanish state, which have in turn shaped different
patterns of class reproduction for state managers. Through it, corporations com-
peted for political influence to secure their market success, while political parties
competed with each other by raising illicit funds to boost their campaign
resources, vital to access or revalidate state power. Since political patrons exacted
a portion of the earnings secured for their clients (a 3% kickback or “commission
fee”), they were incentivised to inflate the profits of the real estate industry, as
this increased the bribes that then swelled their electoral war chests.
The analysis has shown that these clientelist dynamics cannot be reduced to a
functional expression of inter-urban competition. Not only did the “iron triangle”
precede the take-off of urban entrepreneurialism, but it also displayed a logic of
its own, one that transcended the local sphere, as clientelist networks were organ-
ised at the regional and even national scales. Nevertheless, the workings of this
informal political structure magnified the reckless local boosterism of these years,
inflating the property bubble to new heights. Corruption, thus, was integral to
the real estate boom that imploded the Spanish economy in the wake of the
great recession.
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Endnotes
1 More recently, the concept of entrepreneurialism has been deployed to explore the rela-
tionship between competitive urban regimes and financialised forms of accumulation.
Whereas some argue that “financialised urban governance as something that succeeds
entrepreneurial urban governance”, others insist that financialisation is not a new phase of
urban governance, “but rather the means through which entrepreneurial urbanism was
enabled in the first place” (for an overview see Aalbers 2019:9–11).
2 Harvey (1978:113) defines the built environment as a “gross generalisation”, in which
he includes the aggregative relation of all infrastructure and housing to the process of pro-
duction. He justifies this level of generality because the built environment is “long-lived,
spatially immobile and often absorbent of large lumpy investments. He also specifies that
capital switching can be “sectoral”, from one sphere of capital accumulation to another, or
“geographical”, from one place to another (Harvey 1978:111).
3 See Jessop (2006) or his critique of Harvey’s capital switching approach.
4 Though Harvey does not reference the switching circuits in his seminal article on urban
entrepreneurialism, his followers have certainly done so. All analysts of Spanish urban
entrepreneurialism cited here trace their accounts to the subterranean mechanics of capital
switching (Charnock et al. 2014:85; Coq-Huelva 2013; Delgado Jimenez 2011; Lopez and
Rodrıguez 2010:317–370). To be sure, Lopez and Rodrıguez do not employ the concept of
urban entrepreneurialism directly—they prefer Molotch’s (1976) notion of “growth
machine” instead. However, their otherwise heavy reliance on Harvey’s theoretical appara-
tus makes their analysis of Spanish inter-urban competition virtually indistinguishable from
Harvey’s “urban entrepreneurialism”.
5 Similar assertions have been made by Coq-Huelva (2013:1225) in this journal.
6 So far, subsequent police investigations have corroborated the existence of regional slush
funds in Madrid and La Rioja, as well as in the Basque province of Vizcaya (Campos 2017).
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